Introduction
Eastern Europe has traditionally been a region of emigration, sending thousands of refugees and migrants to the more developed and democratic west. The recent democratization and rising affluence of some eastern European countries, however, make them increasingly attractive destinations of migrant workers, slowly but surely turning them into immigrant societies. Although immigration and immigrant integration issues do not figure prominently in current political discourse of the region, the uniformly increasing migration trends in eastern Europe emphasize their political potential. How do political parties and their voters respond to the increasing presence of immigrants in the region? What determines the salience and guides the formation of party preferences over immigration and immigrant integration in eastern Europe?
This article addresses how political parties incorporate the issues of immigration and immigrant integration into their political profiles. It argues that partisan and voter views on immigration in eastern Europe are crucially formed by ideological views on ethnic minorities, which have been the traditional 'out-groups' in the region. Partisan positions on immigration and immigrant integration are consequently determined by underlying ideological principles concerning cultural openness and acceptance of 'otherness'. Immigrants to eastern Europe are thus viewed as the other 'other'.
By emphasizing the importance of historical affinities between political parties and 'out-groups', together with general socio-cultural outlooks of parties and voters, this ideological argument contributes to the debate on the role of ideology and historical cleavages in eastern European politics. This article demonstrates that on certain socio-cultural issues -such as views on immigrants -eastern European politics are significantly ideologically structured.
This article carries out large-N quantitative analyses of 150 political parties in 11 eastern European countries -Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia -in 2006 and 2010. It complements these analyses with comparisons with western European countries, as well as with analyses of voters in eastern and western Europe. This article uses the Chapel Hill Expert Surveys (CHES) on party positions, together with the 2009 European Election Study, the Database of Political Institutions and World Bank indicators. The first section addresses the changing migratory trends in eastern Europe. The next section presents the theoretical argument generating specific ideological hypotheses concerning party positioning on and emphasis of immigration and immigrant integration issues, while also presenting alternative strategic and structural arguments. The third section discusses the data and methods, and the fourth section presents the analyses and results. The final section serves as a conclusion.
Eastern Europe and Migration
Throughout the late nineteenth and the twentieth century, eastern Europe had been a region of emigration. After waves of migration to North America, the post-war period sent many eastern Europeans seeking refuge from communist authoritarianism in the democratic west. An estimated 6 million Poles and over half a million Czechs left their countries during the communist era (Drbohlav, 2005; Iglicka and Ziolek-Skrzypczak, 2010) , while nearly 200 000 fled Hungary only in the 3 months after the 1956 uprising (Juhasz, 2003) . More recently, eastern Europeans took advantage of the European single market, spawning the proverbial 'Polish plumber', supposedly providing cheap labor in the west. An estimated 700 000 eastern Although the immigration trends in the region point in one direction, the way in which the issues related to immigration enter the political agenda in eastern Europe is much less clear. The following section considers the determinants of partisan response to immigration in eastern Europe, as political parties are key actors in translating social issues into salient, publicly contested political concerns (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) .
Determinants of Party Response to Immigration
Immigration as a social phenomenon is a relative novelty in eastern Europe, and consequently, it remains an under-explored political issue. The immigration trends are, however, slowly generating increased public attention in the region.
2 Political parties are thus approaching a critical juncture when they must choose whether to broach the immigration issue, and how.
This section addresses the considerations parties face when engaging new political issues. It examines both the determinants of the salience of immigration and immigrant integration, and the calculus behind party positioning on both immigration and immigrant integration. Although arguing that partisan response to immigration in eastern Europe is largely determined by ideological factors pertaining to party views of ethnic minorities, the section also presents alternative strategic and structural explanations.
Ideological Determinants
Political parties do not engage new political issues in a vacuum. When a new issue, not aligned to the standing conflict lines of the party system, appears on the political agenda, it increases the dimensionality of party competition. There are suddenly more stances to take. Increased dimensionality is inherently costly. It reduces the simplicity of political choices, taxing voter information, while increasing the uncertainty of party support (Stimson, 2004, p. 63) . Consequently, an introduction of a cross-cutting issue creates pressure for alignment into existing positions. Although some issue alignment may be arbitrary, there are logical linkages between some political issues.
3
A party's response to a new issue is thus likely to proceed from its general ideological commitment, 4 which in turn is a product of underlying social cleavages (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967) . Marks et al (2002, p. 568) argue that 'political parties are not empty vessels into which issue positions are poured in response to electoral or constituency pressures, but are organizations with embedded ideologies'. These ideologies consequently form frames through which political parties engage new political issues, and link them to their existing positions.
Although literature on eastern European parties questions the extent of socially rooted ideologies after communism (c.f. Kitschelt, 1992 Kitschelt, , 1995 Evans and Whitefield, 1993 , 2000 Ost, 1993; Mair, 1997; Kitschelt et al, 1999; Whitefield, 2002; Webb and White, 2007) , there are social cleavages in eastern Europe that survived the communist era, and that inform party positions today. Although communism reshaped the socio-economic structure of society, it strikingly preserved cultural, ethno-linguistic and religious divides -a fact witnessed by the debates surrounding Czechoslovak separation, by the struggle for Baltic independence, and by the Yugoslav wars. These cleavages feature in the ideological orientation of political parties in eastern Europe, and -as I argue here -determine partisan responses to new political issues, such as immigration.
The latent ideological frame underlying the issue of immigration and immigrant integration is associated with approaches to 'otherness'. Triandafyllidou (1999, p. 66) suggests that national identity 'presupposes the existence of Others, other nations or individuals, who do not belong to the ingroup and from which the ingroup seeks to differentiate itself in order to emphasise its distinctiveness and uniqueness'. The elementary determinant of ideological positioning over immigration and immigrant integration is the extent to which the entry and continuous presence of others in a polity is acceptable. In the eastern European context, the traditional national others have been ethnic minorities. Although present in the region for centuries, ethnic minority rights issues have played a central role in political competition in the region since 1989 (Ishiyama and Breuning, 1998) . Recent research suggests that partisan approaches to ethnic minorities have crucially structured party competition in eastern Europe (Rovny, forthcoming) . This leads to an ideological hypothesis concerning party positions on immigration:
Hypothesis 1: Party positions on immigration and immigrant integration in eastern Europe are determined by positions on ethnic minority rights.
However, then how do preferences over immigration relate to the left-right ideological spectrum in eastern Europe? In the west, van der Brug and van Spanje (2009) demonstrate a strong monotonous relationship between the economic leftright dimension (summarizing views over government involvement in the economy) and views on immigration, where the left supports immigration and multiculturalism, whereas the right opposes it. Although scholars of eastern European party politics also consider the economic left-right as a significant dimension of political competition (Kitschelt, 1992 (Kitschelt, , 1995 Markowski, 2006; Marks et al, 2006) , the uniform relationship between economic placement and preferences over immigration is unlikely to be repeated in eastern Europe.
The relationship between economic left-right placement and views on ethnic minority rights in eastern Europe is determined by party relationships to communist federalism and to the most politically salient ethnic groups (Rovny, forthcoming) .
In places where the main ethnic minority consists of members of the nation that formed the center of a communist federation (Estonia, Croatia, Latvia and Slovenia), left parties tolerate or even support the ethnic minorities, or develop multi-ethnic profiles, whereas the right espouses ethnic nationalism. This is because in these communist federal peripheries the opposition to communism assumes both a pro-market and anti-federal character. Anti-communist forces adopt right-wing economic views, while pushing for national autonomy and finally national independence. Simultaneously, in these countries, left parties have a historical association with multinationalism, as the communist federal regime managed and co-opted ethnic minorities, engaging them through various power-sharing mechanisms (see Leff, 1999; Zakosek, 2000) . The left thus adopts multinational outlooks, potentially turning into the representatives of ethnic minorities. Consequently, left party affinities with ethnic minorities encourage left-wing multiculturalism, which later inform the left's views on immigration issues.
On the contrary, in countries with either politically insignificant ethnic minority populations or where the main ethnic minority comes from other nations, than ex-federal centers (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia), left parties have no particular ethnic affinities. They consequently are not induced to cultural openness. They either ignore these issues, or utilize nationalist chauvinism to revive their compromised left-wing ideology after 1989. This leads the left toward conservative stances regarding all 'others'. Conversely, the opposition to communism assumes market economic outlooks combined with social liberalism, making right-wing parties more sympathetic to concerns of ethnic minorities. These positions consequently inform their views toward immigrants.
Given the hypothesized expectation of intimate connection between preferences over immigration and ethnic minority rights, it is logical to expect that the relationship between economic left-right placement and immigration is similarly conditioned by communist federalism and ethnic affinities.
Hypothesis 2:
The relationship between economic left-right positions and positions on immigration and immigrant integration is conditioned by experiences with communist federalism and ethnic affinities. In countries where the main ethnic minority consists of members of the nation that dominated the country under a communist federation, the economic left is associated with more liberal views on immigration, while the right is more conservative. In other countries, the relationship is inverted.
The salience of the immigration issue is also likely to be determined by the salience of the issue of ethnic minorities. Where ethnic minority rights issues play a significant role in political competition, the issue of admitting and integrating immigrants becomes amalgamated into questions concerning the acceptance and incorporation of all others.
Hypothesis 3: The salience of immigration and immigrant integration is determined by the salience of ethnic minority rights.
Finally, the salience of the immigration issue is additionally determined by positioning on immigration. Rabinowitz and MacDonald (1989) present a directional theory of voting, where party (or candidate, or voter) placement reflects the intensity with which they care about a certain side of a political issue. Here '[p]arties can be thought to differ in intensity based on how clearly they present their views and the extent to which they stress the issue. Party intensity serves as a means of exciting voter interest and attention ' (MacDonald et al, 1991 ' (MacDonald et al, , p. 1109 . 'Intensity', can be understood as both heightened issue salience, and extreme issue positioning. Parties that particularly invest in certain issues take outlying positions on these issues (see Rovny, 2012) . It is consequently reasonable to expect that parties that hold extreme positions on an issue also tend to emphasize it:
Hypothesis 4: Parties with outlying positions on immigration are more likely to emphasize immigration issues.
Strategic Determinants
Although ideological arguments provide intuitive explanation of how parties engage new political issues, scholarship on party strategies suggests that political tactics, rather than entrenched ideological profiles, determine partisan response to new issues. This line of study stresses that political parties stand to gain from engaging and emphasizing untapped political issues, which may reshape party competition and redirect votes. Riker (1982 Riker ( , 1986 suggests that political parties raise new issues into political discourse in order to upset the status quo and capture voter attention. Similarly, issue ownership theory and salience theory expect parties to alter vote choice by increasing the salience of political issues on which the party holds an advantageous position, or on which it has better credentials (Budge and Farlie, 1983; Budge et al, 1987; Petrocik, 1996) . Niche party literature extends this argument by suggesting that electorally marginal, small parties have an increased incentive, and greater ease, in introducing novel issues into political competition. This is because they have more to gain from upsetting the established lines of conflict with new issues, on which their mainstream opponents may have no defined positions (Meguid, 2005 (Meguid, , 2008 . In addition, niche parties may be advantaged in their ability to raise new political issues. They tend to be younger organizations, less encumbered by long-standing ideological profiles and membership structures (Rovny and Edwards, 2012) . This allows them to better pursue narrowly defined political aims neglected by mainstream parties.
In eastern Europe fewer parties have entrenched, historically defined ideological platforms, and most party organizations are weaker and party membership lower (Van Biezen, 2003) . Consequently, many parties face low institutional barriers to issue introduction. Combined with higher levels of electoral volatility in the region (Sikk, 2005; Tavits, 2008) , often punishing even the established mainstream, many parties may behave more like niche parties, ready to exploit new issues for political gain. The mechanism, nonetheless, remains the same. The niche literature would expect that in eastern Europe, new issues, such as immigration, are more likely to be raised by electorally marginal parties. Party vote share may thus explain immigration and immigrant integration salience (marginal parties care more about immigration and immigrant integration), as well as immigration policy positions (marginal parties are more likely to oppose immigration and immigrant integration).
Mainstream parties may, however, respond to the 'contagion' from niche parties, such as the radical right. Although parties face varying strategic considerations in the context of radical right party success (Green-Pedersen and Kogstrup, 2008; Bale et al, 2010) , Van Spanje (2010) finds that the radical right 'contagion' affects entire party systems. Consequently, the rise of the radical right has the potential to influence party positions on immigration in the entire party system. The systemlevel vote share of radical right parties may consequently determine immigration and immigrant integration salience (greater vote share of radical right parties leads to greater immigration and integration salience), as well as immigration and integration policy positions (greater vote share of radical right parties leads to more restrictive views on immigration, and to more assimilationist views on immigrant integration).
Structural Determinants
Besides ideological and strategic determinants, party response to new issues may be importantly conditioned by structural factors. Breunig and Luedtke (2008) argue that institutional structure of the party system and of the country determine orientations toward immigration, pointing to the critical role of institutional veto points. The authors demonstrate that governing parties in institutional systems that limit the influence of the majority are less likely to introduce conservative immigration policies. Consequently, institutional variables, such as the number of checks and balances, legislative fractionalization, and electoral system are important determinants of party positions on immigration.
Finally, partisan emphasis on immigration is likely to directly reflect the level of immigration into a country. Givens and Luedtke (2005) suggest that proximity to immigrants affects both salience of immigration and preferences over immigration and immigrant integration policies. Where immigration is higher, it is more likely to be a salient issue, and parties may adopt more restrictive positions on immigration and more assimilationist views on immigrant integration.
Data and Methods
To test the theoretical propositions while controlling for alternative explanations, this article carries out quantitative data analyses on 150 political parties 5 from 11 eastern European countries -Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
6 These analyses are also compared with analyses of 177 western European parties. The article combines data on party positions, country characteristics and voter preferences. With respect to parties, it uses the 2006 and 2010 iterations of CHES which is the most comprehensive expert data set on party positions available (Hooghe et al, 2010; Bakker et al, 2012) .
The choice of an expert survey as a data source on party positioning is warranted thanks to its general advantages: (i) experts evaluate not only pre-electoral statements of parties, but also partisan actions; (ii) expert surveys have generally greater coverage of smaller political parties than the commonly used alternative -the Comparative Manifesto Project data (Volkens et al, 2012) ; (iii) tests of validity suggest that expert surveys provide consistent measures that converge with other measures of party positioning (Steenbergen and Marks, 2007; Bakker et al, 2012) .
I complement this party data with information on country characteristics, such as migration trends and political institutions, available from the World Bank and the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001 ). Finally, in order to test some of the above hypotheses using alternative data, I use the 2009 European Election Study (EES, 2009 ) to address the effect of voter preferences over immigration and immigrant integration on vote choice.
The CHES provide direct measures of party positions and salience on the dependent variables -immigration and immigrant integration. The survey also includes measures of party positioning and salience on ethnic minority rights, as well as general information on economic left-right placement, party families and vote share. To capture the impact of radical right parties on the party system, system-level vote share of radical right parties is operationalized as the percentage of vote for all radical right parties in the dataset in the previous election in a given country. In modeling the impact of political institutions on party positions, this article follows Breunig and Luedtke (2008) by utilizing institutional measures from the Database of Political Institutions (Beck et al, 2001 ). The models consequently control for: the number of checks and balances; legislative fractionalization; electoral threshold and the presence of proportional representation. The analyses of eastern European cases omit the proportional representation variable since all analyzed countries include some proportional representation rules. Proximity to immigrants is captured by net migration. However, since it is reasonable to expect that an increase by 100 000 new migrants would have significantly different effect in Poland than in Slovenia, the models use a standardized measure where net migration is divided by the population of a given country. To test the posited hypotheses, the article performs a series of OLS regressions with cluster-corrected standard errors, a choice motivated by the need to correct for the possibility that observations from the same country in different years may be dependent on each other (Primo et al, 2007) . All of the models presented below have been also estimated using hierarchical linear models, where the intercepts were allowed to vary randomly in order to capture the country-specific nature of the data (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002, p. 234; Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal, 2008) . The hierarchical linear models produced substantively identical results to the OLS models using cluster-corrected standard errors (see the Appendix for details).
Analyses and Results
The first analysis demonstrates the relationship between party positioning on ethnic minorities and preferences over immigration and immigrant integration. Supporting Hypothesis 1, Table 1 demonstrates that party positions on both immigration and immigrant integration are significantly predicted by party positions in ethnic minority rights. This impact is substantively profound. As the three positional measures of immigration, integration and ethnic minorities are on the same 0-10 scale, the model coefficients show that one unit change in ethnic minority preferences (that is a 10 per cent shift on the scale) changes views on immigration by 0.54 units (that is by 5.4 per cent on the scale). The effect on immigrant integration (β = 0.82) is even stronger. With R 2 s of 0.64 and 0.80, the models fare very well in capturing the variance in immigration and integration positioning.
The next set of models turns to consider Hypothesis 2, positing a relationship between economic left-right placement and preferences over immigration and immigrant integration. The literature on western Europe suggests a monotonous relationship where the economic left champions immigration and multiculturalism, while the economic right supports immigration limits and immigrant assimilation. The argument here, which connects preferences over immigration and immigrant integration to ethnic minority rights in eastern Europe, suggests that party positions on immigration and integration are affected by party affinities with ethnic minority groups. Where left parties have historical connections to ethnic minority groups, they are induced to general cultural openness and acceptance of 'others', be they ethnic minorities or immigrants. In these cases, the association between economic left-right and immigrant positions should copy the western European pattern. Where left parties do not have historical affinities with ethnic minority groups, they are not induced to adopt culturally liberal positions, often opting to use minorities as political scapegoats instead. In these cases, the association between economic left-right placement and immigration should have the opposite sign. Table 2 presents models supporting Hypothesis 2. These models include political parties from across western and eastern Europe, 7 in order to demonstrate the intraregional variance in eastern Europe, where some countries resemble their western, rather than eastern, European counterparts. In eastern European countries where left parties have historical affinities with ethnic minorities as these originate from the old communist federal center (Croatia, Estonia, Latvia and Slovenia), the relationship between economic left-right placement and immigration is the same as in western Europe (positive relationship). Here the economic left supports greater immigration and favors multicultural approaches to immigrant integration, whereas the economic right is anti-immigrant and assimilationist. Eastern European countries, where left parties have no affinity with ethnic minority groups, as these do not originate from a federal center, (Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania and Slovakia) stand apart. Here the economic left opposes immigration and is assimilationist, whereas the economic right supports immigration and multiculturalism (negative relationship). A similar pattern, supporting Hypothesis 2, arises when analyzing voter preferences over immigration and immigrant integration across western Europe and the two different parts of eastern Europe. This analysis performs logit models to predict the vote for left-wing parties (operationalized as communist, socialist or social democratic parties) versus right-wing parties (operationalized as Christian democratic, liberal or conservative) 8 across the three regions under consideration. The models predict left vote using voter preferences on immigration (q67) and immigrant integration (q56), while controlling for left-right self-placement (q47), gender (q102), age (q103), education (v200), income (q120) and whether the respondent considers him/herself to be a member of a minority (q108), available from the 2009 European Election Study. Figure 2 summarizes the results across the three regions, while the details are available in Table A3 in the Appendix. In western Europe, vote for left parties is significantly determined by preferences over immigration and immigrant integration. Those favoring liberal immigration and integration policies are more likely to vote for left parties than those opposed (top left panel in Figure 2 ). The contrary is true in eastern European countries where left parties do not have affinities with ethnic minority groups. Here voters are more likely to vote for the left if they support restrictive immigration and assimilationist integration policies (bottom left panel in Figure 2 ).
These results underline the different electoral dynamics across eastern Europe where immigration and integration issues interact with ethnic minority issues in intricate ways. They highlight the fact that in eastern European countries, where the left does not have an affinity to ethnic minority groups, immigration issues significantly affect vote choice and, consequently, election outcomes. Interestingly, in eastern European countries where left parties have historical ethnic affinities, left vote is predicted not by policy preferences, but by ethnic minority status. Simultaneously, we know from Table 2 that in this region of eastern Europe left parties take liberal stances on immigration and integration issues. Furthermore, ethnic minorities in these countries are significantly more open to immigration and hold more liberal views on immigrant integration compared with the majority population.
9 Ultimately, these results emphasize the intimate ideological connection between ethnic minority rights, and immigration and immigrant integration in eastern Europe.
The final analysis addresses the salience of immigration and integration issues in eastern Europe. Hypothesis 3 posits that immigration and integration salience is predicted by the salience of ethnic minority rights. Hypothesis 4 expects that parties with outlying positions on immigration and integration are more likely to emphasize immigration and integration issues. The models thus predict immigration and integration salience by position and position squared, as well as ethnic salience, while controlling for alternative explanations. Table 3 presents evidence supporting Hypotheses 3 and 4. The salience of ethnic minority rights is a significant predictor of immigration and integration salience. It is particularly strong in predicting the salience of immigrant integration, where a unit change in ethnic salience (that is a 10 per cent change along the scale of ethnic salience) leads to over 0.41 unit shift (4.1 per cent) in integration salience. The table, showing a significant effect of the square terms of immigration and integration position, also supports Hypothesis 4.
10 Parties that hold extreme views on immigration and integration tend to care about the topics more than parties taking centrist positions. Figure 3 , showing the detailed effect of positioning on salience, however, moderates this claim. The figure demonstrates that, although a curvilinear relationship posited by Hypothesis 4 is indeed present, parties at the more conservative end of the spectrum -those opposing immigration and supporting immigrant assimilation -tend to put significantly greater emphasis on these issues than parties on the liberal extreme.
The results generally underline the centrality of ideology in the formation of preferences on issues of immigration and immigrant integration. The importance of ideological coherence between issues is exemplified by the results showing that immigrant integration positioning and salience tend to be predicted by ethnic minority positioning and salience slightly better than immigration (compare across the two models in Tables 1 and 3 ). This outcome is logical since the issue of immigrant integration, concerning the extent to which 'out-groups' should adapt to majority culture, is conceptually very close to the issue of ethnic minority rights, which reflects on the extent to which 'out-groups' should be afforded exceptional treatment, such as minority language use.
Conclusions
When incorporating the issues of immigration and immigrant integration into their profiles, political parties in eastern Europe reflect their ideological principles regarding cultural openness and acceptance of 'otherness'. Although immigration is a relatively new social phenomenon in eastern Europe, eastern European parties and voters have keenly developed preferences on how inclusive or exclusive their societies should be with respect to 'others'. These preferences over 'otherness' have been shaped by historical views on and engagements with ethnic minorities, which have formed the traditional 'out-groups' in eastern Europe. Views on ethnic minority rights are thus a strong determinant of preferences over immigration and immigrant integration. Parties follow their positions on ethnic minority rights when formulating their responses to immigrants. Similarly, parties that are deeply concerned about ethnic minority rights also tend to be more engaged in the issues of immigration and -even more so -immigrant integration. The issue of immigrant integration is particularly well predicted by views on ethnic minority rights, which is likely due to the conceptual similarity between the cultural acceptance of distinct ethnic minorities and the acceptance of distinct immigrants. The effect of the conceptual link between these two issues further underlines the importance of ideology in issue incorporation.
The association between views on ethnic minorities and views on immigrants creates two distinct patterns connecting left-right placement with positions on immigration in eastern Europe. In eastern countries where left parties have historical affinities with ethnic minorities, the left holds liberal socio-cultural views, accepts higher levels of immigration and champions multiculturalism, whereas the right adopts conservative views -very much like in western Europe. On the contrary, in countries where left parties do not have any specific ethnic minority affiliations, the left either ignores ethnic minorities or uses them as political scapegoats. Here the left is culturally conservative, and is subsequently not induced to adopt pro-immigrant stances. In these countries, it is the right that supports greater cultural openness, multiculturalism and liberal immigration policies.
The analyses presented here underline the centrality of ideological preferences in the formation of positions on new political issues, even in eastern Europe, where the impact of ideology has been considered precarious at best. This argument points to the importance of historical cleavages and ideological associations between various socio-cultural issues. It is critical that literature on eastern European party competition recognize that -despite the socially levelling experience of communismeastern European societies retained a number of critical socio-cultural divides that determine how new political issues enter the politics of the region. The approaches to ethnic minorities have formulated the ideological principles concerning the 'other'. These principles are now applied to new-coming immigrants who thus become the other 'other'.
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